Margins: Polar Politics by Burchell, David
2 COLUMNS
MARGINS
Polar Politics
When Mikhail Gorbachev claims to 
be a socialist in the mould of Willy 
Brandt and the Swedish SAP (ALR 
133, October), we really know Com­
munism is dead. Not that we ought 
to take Gorbachev's miraculous 
conversion on the road from the 
Crimea too seriously In itself; after 
thirty years or more as a member of 
the CFSU, his sudden (re)discovery 
of W estern social democracy  
seemed a little forced.
But Gorbachev's statement does at 
least accurately reflect one important 
reality. Like many former socialists in 
the formerly Eastern European satel­
lites, he realises the game is up, not 
just for Communism, but also for the 
foreseeable future for socialism more 
broadly, in the old Soviet bloc. 
Henceforth, it seems, the parameters 
of political debate there will be 
staked out between a number of com­
peting political currents, the 
'rightness' or 'leftness' of which in 
Western terms is not always immedi­
ately apparent. At present these 
would appear to be: Westem-style 
so dal democracy, a form of West 
European Christian democracy, a 
peculiarly rigid interpretation of 
Anglophone neo-liberalism, and old- 
style Russian atavistic nationalism, 
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At the moment in the ex-Soviet 
Union the main political and 
ideological struggle is between a 
loose coalition of the first three 
against an unholy alliance of the 
fourth — old-style primordial Rus­
sian nationalism— and the remnants 
of hardline Soviet Communism.
Over the next few months and year, 
one suspects, as Communism fades 
from view, the parameters of political 
debate will be reshaped closer to the 
eastern European model - where the 
major dividing line at present is be­
tween those who want a more rapid, 
and those who (for various reasons) 
want a Blower transition to the 
market. Even this, though, will not 
dearly replicate the Western ideal of 
a 'spectrum', with calibrated 'Left' 
and 'Right' arms, because the forces 
on either side will remain disparate 
and fluid. On the 'slower transition' 
side— at present the losers— will be 
found both social democrats and 
nationalist reactionaries, old-style 
Communists acting in defence of the 
old order and new -style trade 
unionists acting in defenoe of living 
standards.
One response from the western Left 
to these seismic political shifts is to 
argue that it all doesn't really matter 
to 'us', anyway; 'we' gave up on 
Soviet-style socialism years ago: and 
it's all just a matter of the collapse of 
'stalinism', rather than socialism, 
anyway. However, there is some­
thing a little hollow about this sort of 
disclaimer. After all, regardless of 
subsequent disclaimers, the tradition 
of 1917 has had a seminal influence 
on the character of the Western politi­
cal lexicon over the last three 
quarters of a century. Indeed, the 
very conception of 'the political 
spectrum' in Western politics is itself 
the product of the two epoch-making 
events of modem European history: 
the French Revolution (which coined 
the vocabulary of 'Left' and 'Right') 
and the Soviet Revolution (which 
created the divisions within the left- 
of-centre spectrum which we take for 
granted today, and more particularly 
the conception of calibrations of 
'leftness' defined by proximity to, or 
distance from, the revolutionary ab­
solute).
Most people on the Western Left 
would probably now concede that 
the identification of 'Left' and 'Right' 
with 'progress' and 'reaction' respec­
tively (the tradition founded in 1789), 
no longer makes much sense — 
regardless of whether or not one sub­
scribes to any of the various gospels
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of postmodernism. And few would 
presum ably still use the 
'revolutionary'/'social democrat' 
polarity as ideal end points for the 
graph line of left-of-centre politics. 
Yet still, curiously, we nearly all still 
talk as if these were, in fact, the most 
m eaningful definitions in 
democratic politics. We still habitual­
ly describe the Right of the political 
spectrum as 'conservatism' - even 
though, as Paul Keating is fond of 
pointing out, the Left nowadays 
spends more time defending the 
status quo than does the Right. And 
it seems clear that the Cold War 
divisions in the Australian labour 
movement are going to long oudive 
the withering of the international 
blocs around which they were or­
ganised.
This lends a strange sense of 
schizophrenia to much contem­
porary debate on the left side of 
politics. At one level it is freely ad­
mitted that the self-definition of left 
and labour politics is 'in crisis', and 
that the collapse of the old Soviet 
model is not without consequence 
for our own vision of the good 
society. In the very next breath, 
though, conversation usually 
proceeds as if this crisis had been 
resolved, and resolved decisively in 
favour of the old verities.
Perhaps it is this schizophrenia 
which explains the mood of defen­
siveness and 'return to 
fundamentals' which seems current­
ly to be abroad in leftish politics. 
After a decade of pragmatism and 
compromise, it's asserted, now is the 
time for the Left to return to its tradi­
tional role as conscience of the labour 
movement and guardian of maxi- 
mali st rectitude. On the face of it, one 
m ight have thought the times 
demanded something radically dif­
ferent a comprehensive rethinking 
of the 'boundaries' of politics and of 
the instincts and assumptions under­
lying them, for instance. But what if 
it is precisely the fear of the loss of 
identity' which this process might 
create which causes otherwise well- 
intentioned people to fall back on the 
eternal truths?
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